Watchdog Report Shows Bureau Of Prison Falling Short On First Step Act

$1.23 Billion Spent Without Clear Results

Between fiscal years 2022 and 2024, Congress provided $1.23 billion specifically for First Step Act implementation. The expectation was to expand evidence-based programming and prepare incarcerated individuals for successful reentry. Instead, the OIG found that large portions of that funding were diverted into areas that do not clearly advance those goals.

One of the most striking findings involves more than $258 million spent on inmate telephone access. While the law allows phone access as an incentive for participation in programming, the BOP provided free calls to all inmates regardless of participation. Even more troubling, the agency reimbursed itself approximately $106 million above its own estimated costs for those services. In the past, the BOP made inmates pay for their own calls, as they do many times while incarcerated such as personal hygiene items and many food and clothing items).

That raises two issues. First, whether the spending aligns with congressional intent. Second, whether the BOP effectively converted time-limited appropriations into funds with no expiration by moving them into internal accounts.

Nearly $120 million was transferred to the Department of Labor for a workforce grant program. The BOP maintained limited oversight of how those funds were used, and by late 2025, less than half of the expected funds had actually been spent.

This is not just inefficient spending. It represents a missed opportunity to deliver programming where it was most needed.

No Demonstrated Cost Savings

From the beginning, one of the key selling points of the First Step Act was cost reduction. The theory was simple. If people receive programming that lowers recidivism, fewer people return to prison, and long-term costs decline. However, the data reflected in the OIG report, combined with the BOP’s own annual updates, shows no clear evidence that this is happening.

According to OIG, as of April 2026, $16.8 million from a single year’s appropriation remained unused and will likely be transferred out of First Step Act purposes entirely. At the same time, spending patterns reveal that significant portions of funding are not tied directly to program delivery. Instead, resources are absorbed by administrative inefficiencies, delayed projects, and spending categories that have little measurable impact on recidivism outcomes. In an interview I had with BOP Director William Marshall III earlier this year, highlighted some of his priorities to address the misuse of funds by the BOP under previous leadership. As Marshall told me then, “We found over 60 positions that used First Step Act funding that had nothing to do with the First Step Act.”

Programming Exists on Paper More Than in Practice

The BOP has consistently reported progress in expanding program availability. Annual updates highlight new offerings, increased participation, and a growing list of approved programs. The OIG report tells a more complicated story.

While program availability has technically increased, access remains limited in practice. Facilities often lack the staff, space, or operational stability to deliver programs consistently. As a result, many incarcerated individuals are unable to participate even when programs are listed as available.

The consequences are significant. According to OIG, about 24 percent of individuals released early under First Step Act provisions between 2022 and 2024 completed no programming at all.

This outcome directly contradicts the law’s intent. Early release was supposed to be earned through participation in recidivism-reducing programs. Instead, individuals can accumulate credits simply by being willing to participate, even when no program slots are available.

Staffing Shortages Undermine FSA

As of mid-2024, the Bureau had filled just over half of the positions authorized to support First Step Act implementation. Even by early 2026, a significant number of positions remained vacant.

These shortages have ripple effects across the system. Teachers are unavailable to lead classes. Clinicians cannot deliver treatment programs. Existing staff are frequently reassigned to security roles, referred to as augmentation, further reducing program capacity.

In some cases, facilities have built dedicated program spaces that sit unused because there is no one available to teach the courses. The result is a system where funding exists, programs are approved, and infrastructure may even be in place, but delivery fails due to a lack of personnel.

Operational Realities Limit Access to Programming

Even when staff are available, operational conditions often prevent consistent program delivery. Lockdowns and modified operations, frequently triggered by staffing shortages or security concerns, restrict inmate movement and suspend programming. When programs are interrupted, they take longer to complete, reducing the number of participants who can cycle through them.

Physical space is another constraint. Many facilities lack adequate classrooms or training areas, forcing programs to compete for limited space or operate under suboptimal conditions.

These barriers are not new. They have been documented in prior oversight reports. What is new is the scale of funding that has been allocated without resolving them.

Reliable Data Hides True Performance

The BOP cannot consistently track how often programs are offered, who is actually participating, or whether program availability matches reported claims. In some cases, individuals are listed as participating in programs that are not even being offered at their facility. This creates a fundamental problem. Without accurate data, it is impossible to measure success, allocate resources effectively, or demonstrate accountability.

It also undermines public reporting. The BOP’s published program guides suggest widespread availability, but internal data shows that many of those programs are not consistently delivered.

Why This Matters

The First Step Act represents one of the most significant criminal justice reforms in decades. Its success or failure will shape future policy decisions on sentencing, rehabilitation, and prison funding.

The OIG report does not suggest that the law itself is flawed. Instead, it highlights a gap between policy design and operational execution. It should also be noted that significant progress has been made since Director Marshall appointed Special Assistant to the Director Rick Stover, to troubleshoot a number of First Step Act problems by heading a task force. In less than a year on the project, the BOP has seen improvements to its calculator that more accurately reflects when an inmate who earns First Step Act credits should be released.

Without meaningful changes, the risk is clear. The First Step Act becomes another well-intentioned reform that fails to achieve its objectives, not because the idea was wrong, but because the implementation fell short.

What Needs to Change

The path forward is not complicated, but it does require discipline, something Director Marshall has named as a priority.

First, funding must be tied more directly to program delivery. Spending that does not clearly support rehabilitation should be reevaluated.

Second, staffing shortages must be addressed as a priority. Without instructors and program staff, no amount of funding will produce results.

Third, transparency must improve. Accurate data is essential for measuring outcomes and maintaining public trust.

Finally, incentives must align with outcomes. Early release should be tied to actual program completion, not simply the willingness to participate.

The OIG report provides a roadmap for reform. The question is whether policymakers and agency leadership are willing to follow it.