U.S. And Ukraine Face The Same Ballistic Missile Challenge

Ukraine’s Long Missile Siege

Ukraine has been under an escalating bombardment from Russia four years. This initially comprised a mix of air-launched missiles, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. In September 2022 these were augmented with a steadily rising drumbeat of Shahed drones, first tens, then hundreds, now thousands.

In July, Russia launched an estimated 381 missiles at Ukraine, including 126 ballistic missiles. There were also some 5,000 Shahed-type drones.

The big difference is that Ukraine brought down almost 90% of the Shaheds, which are slow and be taken out by interceptor drones and mobile fire groups with machine guns. It brought down approximately 40% of the missiles – mainly cruise missiles and slower air-launched.

Ballistic missiles like the Iskander with a speed of over Mach 6 – 4,600 mph—are much harder to shoot down. Last night Russia launched 24 Iskanders, and Ukraine was not able to bring down any of them.

The only weapon capable of shooting down these missiles is the Patriot PAC-3. A year ago, Ukraine has supplies of Patriots and achieved a good intercept rate, but as stocks run out more Iskanders have been getting through.

President Zelensky has repeatedly requested more Patriots and been turned down. He warns that without them Ukraine could face a massive winter crisis if Russia targets power plants as it has done before and plunges the country into the cold and dark.

Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, electronic warfare expert and advisor to President Zelensky, estimates that Russia is producing around 70 Iskanders per month. Unless there is some way to stop them, each of those missiles will deliver a 1,000-pound high explosive warhead on a vital target.

A Short Conflict With Iran

The American story is different and much shorter. According to a recent report by thinktank CSIS when the U.S. entered into conflict with Iran in February, it had some 2,330 Patriot missiles. By the time of the “ceasefire” in April this was down to 1,030, and the total is now down to an estimated 759-827.

This means that in the hot stage of the conflict the U.S. was expending more than 32 Patriots per day, and existing stocks would be exhausted in less than 30 days of action if things escalated to that level again.

Missile stocks will not actually run down to zero, as missiles will be conserved carefully and some held in reserve, but the falling stockpiles will give commanders increasingly difficult choices about where to send remaining stocks and whether they can afford to defend everything, everywhere all the time.

The problem in this case is not that the U.S. has been under a particular heavy bombardment by ballistic missiles. Iran does not have anything like the missile arsenal that Russia does, but it is a major producer of drones. In fact, the Shahed drones which are Russia’s mainstay were originally imported from Iran until Russia started making them under license.

The problem seems to be that the U.S expended significant number of Patriots on low-value, low-performance threats like the Shahed. As former U.S. Air Force officer now military analyst Aaron Brynildson put it in The Independent in April: “The U.S. military for now has a $1 million answer to a $20,000 question.”

The U.S. is scrambling to get more Patriot PAC-3s. They are by far the biggest item in the U.S. Army’s missile budget for next year: 2,798 Patriot missiles on order, costing a cool $12 billion.

The cost, $4,987,857 per missile according to the latest figures, is a major reason why stockpiles are not bigger. Makers Lockheed Martin recently announced a “low cost” version dubbed Adapted Capability Effector or ACE which will be around half the cost; it is not clear how performance will be affected.

The Pentagon is working hard to get Patriot production scaled up fast. But this will not solve the immediate shortfall. Any conflict with Iran will eat into stockpiles, while allies in the region also clamor for more Patriots to defend themselves. And a recurrence of the high-intensity operations as seen at the start of the conflict could lead to crisis levels within weeks.

And, as CSIS note, reducing Patriot stockpiles “create a near- to medium-term risk for U.S. readiness to fight a war against China in the western Pacific.” Winning a small conflict creates the risk of losing a much more consequential one later on.

Clearly President Trump is unhappy with the situation, with recent reports of bad-tempered exchanges with Pete Hegseth over the missile shortage. But the U.S. has tremendous financial resources, and the conflict in Iran is not existential, so the situation may be resolved over time.

Shoot The Archer Not The Arrow

Ukraine is developing its own ballistic missile interceptor, while also seeking to produce Patriot missiles under license, Again, neither solves the immediate problem and more direct measures are needed. And traditional “exquisite” weapons like Patriot may not be the answer.

This week President Zelensky announced a renewed focus on shooting the archer not the arrow,

“Ukraine will destroy Russian missile launchers to reduce strikes on Ukrainian cities,” he told a meeting of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council. “Our military knows they must destroy the enemy’s launchers to reduce strikes on Ukraine, its critical infrastructure, and civilians. They are working on this and will continue to do so.”

This has always been the preferred approach, but it is extremely challenging. As presidential advisor and military expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov notes, the 8×8 wheeled Iskander TEL (transporter, erector, launcher) trucks are difficult targets. They often travel along forest roads offering plenty of cover to see for three to five hours to reach a firing position. This is typically around 150 kilometers from the border, outside the range of HiMARS and other artillery.

The Oryx database of Russian losses records just 4 confirmed hits on Iskander TELs so far out of a fleet of more than 100. .

Ukraine will need excellent long-range reconnaissance and strike assets to stand any chance of hitting the Iskander TELs. However, its medium-strike capability, finding and hitting targets up to 200 km away, has improved greatly in recent months, for example virtually shutting down supply routes to occupied Crimea.

Success against Iskanders is likely to rely on foreign intelligence sources, in particular U.S. satellite and other sensors.

This approach turns war asymmetric again. Where the U.S. has been using expensive missiles to shoot down low-cost drones in the air, Ukraine may use low-cost drones to take out expensive missiles on the ground. Just as AI-enabled Hornet drones patrol the highways to Crimea looking for fuel tankers, other drones may patrol the forest roads to detect passing Iskander TELs.

Ukrainian ballistic missiles offer another way of hitting Iskanders, but these are not operational.

Meanwhile attacks ever further down the chain—targeting factories making ballistic missiles the component that go into them—are also likely to be ramped up. This will likely require Flamingo FP-5 cruise missiles or similar large munitions, but may ultimately be more effective.

The next few months will be a test for the U.S. and Ukraine. All eyes will be on the skies to see how this plays out.